Louisiana Court Rules in Favor of Asbestos Victim’s Family in Insurance Coverage Dispute

Appeals court rules insurers failed to prove policy exclusion applied to long-latency disease claim.
By: | June 18, 2025

Ambiguity in insurance policy language prohibits insurers from denying coverage of a wrongful death claim based on time limitations, according to a decision by the Louisiana 4th Circuit Court of Appeal.

The appeals court’s ruling reversed a lower court’s decision in May vs. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co. Inc., ruling that Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA) cannot apply a 36-month exclusion clause to bar a mesothelioma claim filed decades after policy expiration.

The case stems from the 2019 death of Monroe Wade May, who developed mesothelioma after working as a stevedore from the mid-1960s through the 1970s. His heirs filed a wrongful death and survival action in July 2020, alleging Mr. May was exposed to asbestos during his employment with Louisiana Stevedores Inc.

During May’s employment, Louisiana Stevedores carried workers’ compensation and employer’s liability (WC/EL) insurance through Liberty Mutual and Employer’s National Insurance Company (ENIC). After ENIC’s insolvency, LIGA assumed statutory obligations to provide coverage.

The insurers sought to deny coverage based on “Exclusion (e)” in their standard policies, which limited coverage for “bodily injury by disease” claims to those made within 36 months of policy expiration. They argued that mesothelioma is unambiguously a “bodily injury by disease” under policy definitions, making the claim untimely.

The plaintiffs contended that policy language created ambiguity about whether mesothelioma should be classified as a “bodily injury by disease” or a “bodily injury by disease caused by an accident.” They argued this ambiguity should be construed in May’s favor, as is standard in insurance contract interpretation.

The court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding the policy’s Definition (c) unclear. The definition stated that “the contraction of disease is not an accident” but also that “only such disease as results directly from a bodily injury by accident is included within the term ‘bodily injury by accident.'” The court found this language created an ambiguity about what constitutes a “bodily injury by disease caused by accident.”

“The policies herein do not include a list of diseases designated as bodily injury by disease or bodily injury by disease caused by accident. Nor do they contain explicit definitions of either category of disease,” the appeals court noted. “The policies’ provisions simply give no guidance to ascertain the suggested meaning of bodily injury by disease caused by accident.”

The Louisiana appeals court also found that the insurers failed to meet their burden of proof regarding the existence of Exclusion (e) in the policies, as they did not produce the actual policies but relied on secondary evidence.

In its ruling, the court applied established principles of contract interpretation: “When an insurance policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the insurer has not met its burden of proof to enforce an exclusionary clause and the policy is strictly construed against the insurer in favor of coverage.”

Judge Karen K. Herman dissented, arguing that plaintiffs never questioned the existence of the standard form policies in the trial court and that recent Louisiana 4th Circuit decisions found similar exclusionary language clear and applicable to bar asbestos-related claims.

This decision has implications for insurance coverage in long-latency disease cases, potentially opening doors for claimants seeking compensation for asbestos-related illnesses decades after exposure.

View the full opinion here. &

The R&I Editorial Team can be reached at [email protected].

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