Cover Story

Raising the Costa Concordia

Insurance foots the bill for the largest marine recovery project in history.
By: | September 1, 2013 • 13 min read

The plan to raise the Costa Concordia — the largest and most expensive wreck removal operation in maritime history — is a marine engineering marvel. But a successful outcome is far from assured and the cost is approaching $1 billion.

When the massive Costa Concordia passenger ship ran aground on Jan. 13, 2012, claiming 32 lives, it entered the marine insurance record books.

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Hull insurance on the vessel, at more than $500 million, is now paid off by insurers, which include XL, Generali and RSA.

But the removal of the wreck of the Costa Concordia, the largest such project ever attempted, is driving costs onto additional insurers that could reach $1 billion. Those carriers include P&I (protection and indemnity) clubs, which are, in essence, marine mutual insurers owned by ship owners and related interests.

Those charged with righting the decaying ship and plucking it off the reef are in a bind. Each day on the reef weakens the ship’s hull. Magnifying the ship recovery risk is the size of the Costa Concordia. The ship measures about the length of three football fields and weighs 114,500 gross tons.

By far, the biggest complication is the fact that the ship is wrecked in the environmentally sensitive Tuscan Archipelago National Park, a protected coral reef as well as a popular tourist destination.

The wreck must be removed whole in order to avoid releasing a swamp of debris and pollutants into the waters. For this reason, the Italian government is paying close attention to the project.

The need to remove the wreck in one piece left only the most expensive recovery option open: parbuckling and re-floating. Parbuckling, which refers to the process of rolling the ship back up to an upright position, is not a new invention. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S. military recovered the capsized USS Oklahoma in much the same way. For the Concordia though, the costs involved in such an undertaking would be extraordinary.

“The instructions are ‘Get it off [the reef] and we’ll worry about costs later,’ which is the worst thing for an underwriter to hear,” said Steven Weiss, vice president, Marine Engineering and Project Cargo with Liberty International Underwriters.

Just as troubling as the cost, the shadow hanging over the plan is that a parbuckling operation has never been attempted on a ship anywhere near the size of the Costa Concordia. Even now, some still have doubts about whether it can really be done.

Getting Ready To Roll

From the moment the Costa Concordia came to rest on the reef, the race was on to avoid an environmental catastrophe. The ship was still carrying 2,300 tons of diesel fuel.

Dutch salvor Smit Salvage was brought in to pump out Concordia’s 17 fuel tanks — not as straightforward a task as it might seem. Draining the tanks would shift the vessel’s equilibrium, likely causing it to topple off the reef and sink, hemorrhaging fuel in its wake.

Smit used a process called hot-tapping, a painstaking method of pumping hot water into the vessel at the exact same rate that fuel is being pumped out, in order to keep the weight constant.

The fuel removal process alone took a team of 100 experts from around the world, with the aid of 20 platforms, tugs, transport ships, crane barges, tankers and oil spill response vessels. However, the 31-day operation was just a warm-up for the work that would soon begin.

Concordia

The contract to remove the wreck was awarded to a team comprised of Florida-based salvor Titan Salvage and Italian marine engineer Micoperi. The Titan-Micoperi plan has engaged 450-plus crewmen and divers from 19 countries, working around the clock for more than a year, with a menagerie of least 25 marine vessels and crafts operating at any given time.

“The number of engineers and amount of computing time they’ve used on this was probably equivalent to the first moon landing,” said John Phillips, vice president, Marine Hull, Liability & Cargo, Liberty International Underwriters.

That’s probably not far from the mark — it took three supercomputers running for weeks to model the wreck removal plan.

Work on the project began in June 2012, but parbuckling remained a distant goal. Every day that the ship lay on its underwater perch, it remained in danger of sliding down the steep seabed and sinking into 230-foot deep water, likely breaking apart in the process. Divers spent months stabilizing the vessel, securing it with chains, cables and anchor blocks to prevent it from becoming dislodged prematurely.

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About 65 percent of the ship lies beneath the water, its interior almost completely flooded. Therefore, the ship can’t float on its own and it will need a stable floor to support it before it can be refloated. Titan and Micoperi constructed a six-part subsea platform, aligned precisely so that the Concordia will land squarely on it once its rotation is complete.

Simultaneously, enormous airtight boxes called sponsons are being welded to the exposed side of the ship. The 15 sponsons, most around 10 stories high and weighing up to 500 tons, will be filled with seawater initially. They will act as a cantilever, adding weight and assisting in the rotation.

The main event — the parbuckle — will be a slow and tense operation, lasting at least two days. With a network of strong cables, the team must apply enough force to rotate the vessel, while being careful not to put too much stress on the hull.

Concordia2

“There are a couple of big assumptions you’ve got to make,” explained Capt. Rich Habib, vice president and managing director of Titan Salvage.

“The amount of force you have to apply depends on the weight of the thing you’re going to rotate, where it’s going to pivot, and the center of gravity. It’s a simple physics problem if you knew all of the variables … but you don’t always know.”

The more force, the more risk. And for a ship that’s been languishing in the water this long, the risks are intensified. The Concordia’s hull is now covered in rust and is significantly weaker than it was 20 months ago.

“The water that it’s in is relatively warm temperature and that leads to more rapid corrosion,” said LIU’s Weiss. “The hull integrity of the vessel would become even more compromised.”

There’s no question that the parbuckling will be a nail-biter of an event. The ship is already in a stressed condition, lying in a position that the designers didn’t intend it for, said Habib.

“Now I’m going to add force to it. So I’m going to have a lot of distortions and things breaking and popping and so forth. It’s not a clean operation.”

After the ship has been rotated, most of it will be underwater. A matching set of 15 sponsons will be welded to the other side of the ship.

Hydraulic pumps will be used to force the seawater out of the sponsons and fill them with air, displacing water to create enough external buoyancy to lift the ship.

Slowly, the Costa Concordia will rise. But even then, a high degree of risk remains. The “what ifs” abound, said Michael Brown, area executive vice president, Marine, at Arthur J. Gallagher and Co.

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“The wreck could slide off the table while they try to pump air into the sponsons, or a sponson could fail or come loose, and it could sink.”

If that were to happen in deep water, some might consider it a blessing. But if it re-sank in shallow water, it would be a whole new ball game.

Either way, this operation is getting expensive, very expensive.

“With a lot of salvage events, the contract is bid with a [fixed] number. In a situation like this, it’s an open ended cost — there’s not an upper limit on it,” said Weiss.

“Because of the restrictions being placed by the government, the bottom line is they’ve got to remove the wreck. It doesn’t matter how much it costs, they’ve got to get it out of there.”

Salvors will continue to attempt the removal of the wreck until the limits of liability of the clubs is reached, said Brown.

And there’s the rub: “It’s an interesting fact that P&I clubs usually write vessels with unlimited liability except in the case of pollution,” said Brown. “So we’re talking mega potential loss. It could get worse or it could start all over again.”

The Titan-Micoperi plan has been vetted repeatedly, but challenges, or worse, surprises, may remain.

“We refloat things all the time, but we may not know the extent of the damage 100 percent beforehand so we have risk there too,” said Habib.

The team will have people and equipment in place “to ensure that once we float it, we can hold it.”

A Foundation That Flexes to Fit

Every salvage project, from a small capsized craft to a shipwrecked luxury cruise liner, carries its own unique circumstances and set of risks. Salvors need to rely on insurance programs that allow them to adapt to whatever comes their way.

Titan Salvage executives are keenly aware that their insurance program is the difference maker, giving the company the security it needs to operate in a risky industry. But it goes deeper than that. A dynamic insurance program gives salvors the freedom they need to be able to bid on any project quickly. It also becomes part of the overall value that the salvor has to offer its clients. Habib said the strength of the company’s insurance program helps set Titan apart.

“My insurance covers are not a cost to me; they’re a tool that I use to do my business. My underwriters are my partners,” said Habib.

Dwight Menard is vice president, risk management for Crowley Maritime Corp., the parent company of Titan Salvage.

“Crowley relies heavily on its core insurance program that is both well established, but also very flexible,” said Menard. “It has the ability to quickly respond to either a $1,000 job or a multimillion dollar job. Salvors’ insurance is a different animal — it’s unique and very specialized.”

Salvors’ protection and indemnity coverage must be broadly worded to cover regularly assigned employees as well as additional crew that may be hired for any given job. It also has to adapt to the intricacies of employment classifications.

“Salvage jobs may occur anywhere in the world, so you could have jurisdictional issues — are salvage workers seamen? Are they considered longshore and harbor workers? Or do they fall under a foreign employment scheme for injuries on the job? The P&I coverage for the salvage crew is extremely broad and allows the flexibility to cover any of those scenarios should an injury occur on a salvage job. It’s a very unique but absolutely essential type of cover for us.”

Salvors’ liability covers the operations of the salvor while undertaking the salvage project. In a situation like the Costa Concordia’s, where the vessel has already been declared a constructive total loss, the issue of damage to the vessel is moot. But a salvor still requires cover for damage to third parties, or any legal damages that may occur as a result of the operations of removing the wreck.

“Usually those types of covers are obtained at relatively low limits — low levels being $5 million — for a primary layer,” explained Menard. “So, in addition we have a very well structured bumbershoot and excess liability program to conceivably respond to much larger exposures and liabilities.”

Large scale salvage projects tend to be equipment intensive, but it’s not always possible to have equipment readily available when incidents occur in isolated parts of the world. That’s why some salvors find it more prudent to lease equipment locally, which typically means the salvor will have to provide cover for any physical damage to the equipment — some of it highly specialized as well as high priced.

Menard said that Crowley uses a captive to manage much of its equipment exposure.

“That’s included in the type of risk that we either self insure in the captive, or else cover through reinsurance for values in excess of aggregate deductibles. If it’s an extraordinarily high risk or an unusual piece of equipment, then specialized cover might be the best method of dealing with it. But for the most part, we’re able to cover these exposures through our captive and reinsurance program.”

Size in Perspective

The meter is still running on the financial toll of the Concordia wreck.

The ship’s safe removal remains the concern of The Standard Club and The Steamship Mutual, the lead P&I insurers for the ship, and the rest of the clubs in the International Group of P&I Clubs.

The vessel is reinsured through the International Group’s pooling system and reinsurance program with the London and international reinsurance markets. Costs from intense governmental oversight and the engineering required to safely remove the ship from the reef have pushed the P&I loss reserve to $1.17 billion.

Such eye-popping numbers for the wreck of a single ship have left some questioning whether marine vessels are simply getting too big — big enough for underwriters to start asking at what point a vessel is too risky to insure.

The Costa Concordia, put in service in 2006, was the first of five Concordia-class vessels, built for $570 million and measuring in at 114,500 GT (gross tonnage). But the Concordia’s sister ships are no longer the biggest behemoths afloat. Costa launched the Carnival Dream in 2009, a $741 million, 128,000 GT vessel. There are three Dream-class vessels currently in service, and a fourth 132,500 GT vessel being built.

But of course, the bigger they are, the harder they fall. Or sink, as the case may be.

It seems logical to ask if there might be a tipping point — the point at which the size of the vessel would make a salvage operation so expensive that insuring it would become too big a risk.

“It’s a valid question,” said Tim Donney, global head of Allianz Risk Consulting, Marine. “The truth is the international maritime salvage industry may not be able to keep up with the requirements of disasters such as the Costa Concordia.”

But Titan’s Habib is circumspect on the subject. Contrary to what the perception may be about the Concordia, he said, the project is actually moving at a brisk pace.

“Here, you have the largest passenger vessel in history, by weight — the largest salvage job ever accomplished, and we’re ready to parbuckle it in 14 months. I could name 10 projects that went on for two years or more — five years in one case — and you wouldn’t know one of those names if I rattled them off. There’s this perception that these large vessels are vastly more complex in the way that they have to be done. But it’s still a salvage job and it still has all the risks and variables of floating a 600-foot tanker.”

Bigger doesn’t necessarily change the equation, said Habib. Projects are more expensive for a variety of reasons — and they’re not all related to size.

“The salvor’s tool bag hasn’t changed much over the years,” he said. “What we’re doing on [the Concordia] is bigger than what’s been done before, but we’re using standard techniques. It’s really the requirements being placed on us from the outside that are driving the costs up.

“There’s a spotlight on the job, and that brings to bear all kinds of complications. The bigger the job, the more that’s perceived to be at stake, the more the underwriters and the consultants and the authorities want certainty. That drives the price up exponentially. Certainty comes at a pretty high price in salvage.”

Barring unforeseen disruptions, the Concordia will be parbuckled in late September. Any delay at this point could hurt the odds of a successful removal.

“The longer the job goes on, the greater the risk,” said Habib. “Time is our enemy. Always is, always has been, always will be.”

Michelle Kerr is associate editor of Risk & Insurance. She can be reached at [email protected]

More from Risk & Insurance

More from Risk & Insurance

Black Swan: Cloud Attack

Breaking Clouds

A combination of physical and cyber attacks on multiple data centers for cloud service providers causes economic havoc. Even the most well-prepared companies are thrown into paralyzing coverage confusion.
By: | July 27, 2017 • 10 min read

Scenario

By month 16 of the new presidential administration, the Sunshine Brigade is more than ready to act.

Stoked by their anger over rampant economic inequality, the mostly college-educated group of what might best be called upper-middle-class anarchists — many of them from California, Oregon and Washington State — put in motion the gears of a plan more than two years in the making.

Their logic, to them at least, is unimpeachable. Continued consolidation of economic power into the hands of fewer and fewer corporations is creating a world where the rich increasingly exploit and shut out the poor.

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The rise of the techno giants is accelerating this trend, according to the Sunshine Brigade’s de facto leader Emily Brookes, an All-American rugby player and a graduate of Reed College in Oregon.

With a new presidential administration seemingly bent on increasing the economic advantages of the rich with no end in sight, nothing to do then but break things up; and in so doing break the hold of this technology oligarchy.

As Emily Brookes so forcefully put in her instant messages to the other members of the brigade: Break the Cloud.

With more than 500 members, many of them with ample financial and technical resources, the Sunshine Brigade is very capable of delivering on its plan for a two-pronged attack.

It is also radicalized enough to justify the loss of some human life, even its own countrymen, to “save” — in its collective logic — the tens of millions of global citizens that are living as virtual slaves in this callous, exploitative global economy.

With websites and digitally connected services large and small down for days, irritation turns to fear.

The first wave in the attack is an attempt to infect and shut down the data centers for the top three cloud service providers. It takes months to set up this offensive.

Rather than rely on a phishing scam from outside the firewalls of the service providers, The Sunshine Brigade uses its social and business connections to place three members on each of the cloud provider’s payrolls. An infected link from someone you know, someone in the cubicle right next to you, seems like an unstoppable play.

It only partially works. Only one of the cloud service providers is harmed when an unsuspecting employee clicks on a link from their traitorous co-worker. The released malware manages to cripple a major cloud service provider for 12 hours.

With millions of users affected, the act creates substantial disruption and garners global headlines. Insured losses are around $1.5 billion. But this is just the beginning.

The morning after, the Sunshine Brigade unleashes a far more devastating and far more ruthless Round Two.

Using self-driving trucks, the Sunshine Brigade smashes into five data centers; three on the West Coast, and two in the Midwest. Fourteen employees of those cloud servers are killed and another 23 injured; some of them critically.

This time the Brigade gets what it wanted. The physical damage to the data centers is substantial enough that it significantly affects three of the top four cloud service providers for five days.

With websites and digitally connected services large and small down for days, irritation turns to fear.

Small and mid-sized banks, which host their applications on clouds, are shut down. Small business owners and consumer banking customers immediately feel the brunt. Retailers that depend on clouds to host their inventory and transaction information are also hit hard.

But really, the blow falls everywhere.

In the U.S., transportation, financial, health, government and other crucial services grind to a halt in many cases.

Not everyone is disrupted. Some of the larger corporations are sophisticated enough in their risk management, those that used back-up clouds and had steadfast business resiliency plans suffer minimal disruption.

Many small to mid-size companies, though, cannot operate. Their employees can’t get to work and when they can, they sit idly in front of blank computer screens connected to useless servers.

For the man on the street, this is hell.

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Long lines blossom at the likes of gas stations, banks and grocery stores. A population already on edge from a steady diet of social media provocation becomes even more inflamed.

By nightfall of Day Five, the three major cloud service providers are recovered, and digital “normalcy” begins to creep back. But for many small and medium-sized businesses, the recovery comes way too late.

Economic losses promise to register in the tens of billions. It’s not being too imaginative to think that losses could hit the $100 billion mark.

Two multinational insurers based in the U.S., three Lloyd’s syndicates and a Bermuda insurer signal to regulators that their aggregate cyber-related losses are so great that they will most likely become insolvent.

Emily Brookes and her cohorts were willing to kill more than a dozen people to promote their worldview. In their youthful naiveté, they could not know just how much suffering they would cause.

Observations

For some commercial insurance carriers, the aggregated losses from a prolonged disruption of cloud computing services could be catastrophic, or close to it.

“It’s on a par with any earthquake or hurricane or tornado,” said Scott Stransky, an associate vice president and principal scientist with the modeling firm AIR Worldwide.

AIR modeled the insured losses for the Fortune 1,000 were Amazon’s cloud service to go down for one day. They came up with a figure of $3 billion.

Now consider that most businesses in this country are small businesses, with not nearly the risk management sophistication of the Fortune 1000. Then consider a cloud interruption of five days or more.

Mark Greisiger, president, NetDiligence

“Almost any company you talk about today would rely to some extent on the cloud, either to host their website, to do invoicing, inventory, you name it — the cloud is being used across the board,” Stransky said.

“It’s a significant issue for insurers and one we think about a lot,” said Nick Economidis, an underwriter with specialty carrier Beazley.

“Should a cloud service provider go down, everybody who is working with that cloud service provider is impacted by that,” he said.

“Now, pretty much every software maker is on the cloud,” said Mark Greisiger, president of NetDiligence.

“In the old days, someone would come in and install software on your servers and come in annually for maintenance. That’s all gone bye-bye. Everybody who makes software is forcing you onto their private cloud,” Greisiger said.

The aggregation risk for carriers is complicated by the degree of transparency they have into which insured’s applications are hosted on which cloud provider.

Now here’s the even trickier part. Clouds outsource to other clouds.

“It’s almost becoming a spider’s web of interdependencies on who has access to what in terms of upstream and downstream providers,” Greisiger said.

Determining which of their insureds is hosted on which cloud, and in turn, where that cloud is outsourcing to other clouds can be very difficult for carriers to determine.

Even if a company is careful to diversify the risks they’re taking, they might not realize that a high percentage of insureds are even with the same cloud provider. They could be hit with devastating losses across their entire portfolio of business, said an executive with BDO consulting.

AIR’s Stransky said his company launched a product in April, ARC, which stands for Analytics of Risk from Cyber, which is designed to help carriers gain that much needed transparency.

Among insureds, surviving an event of this magnitude will depend not only on the sophistication of their risk management department, but on the company’s overall ability to negotiate contracts with vendors and suppliers that will indemnify the company in the case of a cloud outage of this duration.

It will also depend on organization’s understanding that there is no off-the-shelf solution that will prevent an event like this or make a company whole after it.

Shiraz Saeed, national practice leader, cyber, Starr Companies

Experts say contracts with cloud service providers, customers and suppliers must be structured so that a company is defended should it lose cloud access for as much as five days or more.

Best practices also include modeling just what your losses would look like in this area, and vetting your full portfolio of insurance policies to understand how each would respond.

One broker said buyers can’t be blamed if the complexities of the coverage issues at stake here are initially hard to grasp.

“It’s becoming a spider’s web of interdependencies on who has access to what.” —Mark Greisiger, president, NetDiligence

“I think it’s the broker’s job to inform the client of this exposure,” said Doug Friel, a vice president with JKJ Commercial Insurance, based in Newtown, Pa.

“You may have business interruption coverage for direct physical damage to your building. But have you ever thought about your business income if your IT structure goes down?” Friel said.

He said many buyers might not realize there is a difference.

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Large businesses should have the resources to demand from their cloud service providers that they be indemnified for the entirety of a cloud failure event. There will be a fee for that, but it will be well worth paying, Friel said.

“You have to push,” Friel said. “They are going to say, ‘Here is our standard contract, sign it.’ ”

Don’t settle for that, he said, although many do in ignorance, he added.

“Where possible, we would look for clients to negotiate their contracts. These business relationships should be mutually beneficial, even if one of these events occur,” said Shiraz Saeed, national practice leader, cyber, for the Starr Companies.

It’s a partnership, he said.

“It shouldn’t be a zero sum game on either side. I think there should be an understanding of what the potential loss might be and then designing a contract around that,” he said.

While cloud service providers are known for having high grade security systems, most average organizations don’t have the means for that. But no matter what a company’s resources, the first step is modeling where your digital assets are, and what you and your customers stand to lose if you lose access to them.

“Most insureds don’t seem to understand the amount of individual loss that you could be subject to,” said Jim Evans, leader of insurance advisory services at BDO Consulting. “Usually this stuff is measured in hours,” he said. “But what if a cloud provider is out for three or four days?” he said.

“Trying to quantify what you did lose in an event is hard enough. Trying to do a modeling exercise about what you could lose? It’s something that just doesn’t get done enough,” he said.

Once you have an understanding of what you own and what you stand to lose, the next step is prioritizing the protection of the assets you have. That means drilling into your contract with your cloud service providers to get the maximum indemnification.

It also means spreading your risk so that if at all possible, not all of your assets or your customers’ assets are housed by one cloud service provider. Cloud platforms can be public, private, or a hybrid of the two.

Understanding where your assets are in that architecture is crucial. Spending the money to insure that they are protected behind a diverse menu of firewalls is highly advisable.

Navigating the different iterations of business interruption coverage in property, cyber and kidnap and ransom policies is also important.

Make sure your broker can provide clarity on the different types of coverages and tailor them to your needs, experts said.

The concept of design thinking is really what’s in play here. Organizations have to work with vendors in every aspect of their operations to design a risk management system that can sustain this kind of hit.

“Build a better mousetrap to protect yourself,” said JKJ’s Friel.

“Depending on your service, you need to have the best and the brightest designing this stuff. Spread the risk.”

“Don’t be afraid to ask for more,” he said.

Postscript

In engineering an attack on the cloud, Emily Brookes and her cohorts accomplished the opposite of what they set out to do.

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Only the largest corporations with the most sophisticated risk management programs were able to survive the attempt to break the cloud with manageable losses.

Small businesses, the true backbone of the U.S. economy, suffered terribly. Entrepreneurs who put their life’s work into their business lost it in many cases.

Those on the lowest part of the economic scale, the working poor, lost their jobs and their ability to cover their rent and grocery bills. They joined the ranks of those subsidized by the government by the millions.  The attempt to break the cloud resulted in an even more polarized society. &

Dan Reynolds is editor-in-chief of Risk & Insurance. He can be reached at [email protected]